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Abstract
We introduce the main concepts and problems in the theory of proof-search in type-theoretic
languages and survey some specic, connected topics. We do not claim to cover all of the
theoretical and implementation issues in the study of proof-search in type-theoretic languages;
rather, we present some key ideas and problems, starting from well-motivated points of departure
such as a denition of a type-theoretic language or the relationship between languages and
proof-objects. The strong connections between dierent proof-search methods in logics, type
theories and logical frameworks, together with their impact on programming and implementation
issues, are central in this context. c© 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Algorithmic proof-search is a fundamental enabling technology throughout comput-
ing science. There is a long history of work in proof-search in a variety of systems of
logic, including classical, intuitionistic, relevant, linear and modal systems, at the propo-
sitional, rst- and higher-order levels. Such work has ranged from the most abstract
to the most practical and has employed the full spectrum of logical techniques, from
proof theory, model theory and recursion theory.
Recently, there has been a great deal of work on proof-search in type-theoretic
languages. Such languages can be thought of as logical frameworks to represent proofs
and to formalize connections between proofs and programs. Here again, the scope
of languages studied and techniques employed has been wide, stretching to include
algebraic and categorical methods.
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From the computational point of view, the type-theoretic component of logical
languages, which may involve propositional, rst-order, higher-order or polymorphic
assignment regimes, introduces signicant challenges for both theoreticians and imple-
mentors.
This introductory article is focussed on the following ideas:
 The notion of a type-theoretic language, in Section 2, including the following topics:
 consequence relations;
 proof-theoretic approaches;
 model-theoretic approaches;
 logical frameworks.
 The view, in Section 3, of reasoning as proof-search or reduction, as opposed to
inference or deduction, together with a discussion of the specically type-theoretic
issues that arise.
 The ro^le of proof-search in programming in Section 4. We consider the state-of-the-
art in proof- and model-theoretic approaches to the semantics of logic programming
with type-theoretic languages. We also consider the current state of applications
of proof-search in functional programming. In particular, we consider the issues
in program synthesis, program extraction, verication and transformation which are
analysed and supported by theoretical and practical work in proof-search.
We conclude the article, in Section 5, with a brief discussion of the need and prospects
for more semantic approaches to the theory of proof-search.
2. Type-theoretic languages
In this section, we aim to x, starting from the notion of consequence relation, what
a type-theoretic language is. For that, we give the proof-theoretic but also the model-
theoretic views and then detail the main characteristics of type theories and logical
frameworks, emphasizing the notion of proof-object.
2.1. Consequence relations
Logic begins with language. Formally, we begin with a formal language, L, with
several syntactic categories, typically including a category of individuals and, most
importantly, a category of well-formed formulae or propositions. Given such a lan-
guage, we can describe a logic L over L as a consequence relation, ‘L, between
nite sequences of propositions which satises the following, in which  denotes an
arbitrary proposition, the  ’s and ’s denote arbitrary nite (possibly empty) sequences
of propositions and \," denotes monoidal combination of sequences:
 Reexivity: ‘L .
 Transitivity: if  1 ‘L 1;  and ;  2 ‘L 2, then  1;  2 ‘L 1; 2.
A consequence relation may also satisfy the following additional properties:
 Commutativity: if   ‘L , then  0 ‘L 0, where  0 and 0 are permutations of  
and , respectively.
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 Weakening: if  1 ‘L 1, then  1;  2 ‘L 1; 2.
 Contraction: if  ;  1;  1 ‘L , then  ;  1 ‘L ; if   ‘L ; 1; 1, then   ‘L ; 1.
In the absence of commutativity other, distinct, formulations of weakening and con-
traction are possible. 1
Example 2.1. Consider a propositional language L with a constant > and two binary
operators  and !. A consequence relation ‘L can be generated by a calculus of
sequents including the rules
‘ Id
1; ; 2 ‘L    ‘L 
1;  ; 2 ‘L  Cut;
together with the additional rules
 ; ;  ; ‘L 
 ;  ; ; ‘L  S1;
 ; ; ‘L 
 ; ; ; ‘L  S2
 ; ; ; ‘L 
 ; ; ‘L  S3;
  ‘L 
 ; ‘L  S4
We refer to this collection of conditions as structural rules: such rules are so called
because they are dened in terms of the structure of sequents and do not refer to the
propositional operators. Let the symbol  denote any binary operator which satises the
conditions that  ; ;  ; ‘  if and only if  ;  ; ‘L  and  ; ‘L  if and only
if   ‘L  and ‘L  . Similarly, let the symbol ! denote any binary operator which
satises the conditions that  ; ‘  if and only if   ‘L  !  and  ;  !  ; ‘L 
if and only if   ‘L  and ;  ‘L . Let the symbol > represent the empty sequence in
the left-hand side of a sequent so that  ; ‘L  if and only if  ;>; ‘L . Then the
smallest consequence relation containing the operators >,  and ! and closed under
the structural rules corresponds to the f>; ;!g-fragment of intuitionistic propositional
logic.
Given a denition of a logic L as a consequence relation ‘L, we can try to char-
acterize L either model-theoretically or proof-theoretically.
(1) Model-theoretically, we must rst establish a class of models and a notion of
satisfaction which together carry the structure of the logical connectives in L.
If M is such a model and j= is such a satisfaction relation, we write
M j=L 
1 Strictly speaking, what we have described so far are simple consequence relations. In [9], there is the
additional requirement of uniformity. Uniformity concerns the internal structure of propositions and requires
\closure under substitution". The formal denition of this idea requires some technical care and so, for
brevity, it is elided here. It is not necessary for our conceptual development.
8 D. Galmiche, D.J. Pym /Theoretical Computer Science 232 (2000) 5{53
to denote that the proposition  holds in M according to j=. Often, such a deni-
tion depends on the internal structure of M, such as that provided by the worlds
of Kripke models, so that we write
M; m j=L 
to denote that the proposition  holds at world m in M according to j=.
A satisfaction relation can be generated inductively, according to the structure
of the propositions in L. For example, the following clauses can be used to gen-
erate the satisfaction relation for the f>; ;!g-fragment of intuitionistic logic over
a preorder W=(W;v):
 W; w j=L> for all w2W ;
 W; w j=L    i W; w j=L  and W; w j=L  ;
 W; w j=L !  i, for every w0 2 W such that wvw0, W; w0 j=L  implies
W; w0 j=L  .
This satisfaction relation is sound and complete with respect to the consequence
relation described in Example 2.1.
(2) Proof-theoretically, we x a system S of axioms and rules which allow us to derive
judgements of provability of the form
S proves   ‘L :
Just as satisfaction relations can be dened by induction on the structure of propo-
sitions, so judgements of provability can be dened by induction on the structure of
propositions, provided structural rules are also taken. Example 2.1 shows us how to
do this, using a sequent calculus [58], for the f>; ;!g-fragment of intuitionistic
propositional logic.
2.2. The proof-theoretic view of type-theoretic languages
The denition of a consequence relation that we have considered so far can be
analysed at the level of Tarski’s semantics [165]: it is truth-conditional in the sense
that we can only know that a consequence   ‘L  holds, not why it holds. However,
we can ask for a representation of the evidence for a consequence. We write
  ‘( ;)L 
to denote that ( ; ) is a proof-object which represents a derivation of  from  .
We assume that propositions  and proof-objects  are given by independent, in-
ductively dened grammars over disjoint signatures  and . Informally, we say
that our representation of proof-objects is type-theoretic if there is a correspondence
between the structure of the propositions and the structure of proof-objects as follows:
 Let propositional consequences
  ‘L 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be generated by a system R of rules and let annotated consequences
  ‘( ;)L 
be generated by a system R of rules. Let r be a rule and let X be a combinator
(in either  or ). We say that r manipulates X if X ’s context in the premisses
of r is dierent from its context in the conclusion of r.
 There is a bijection f between the combinators c2 in the grammar of proof-
objects and combinators, or connectives, C 2 in the grammar of propositions.
Moreover, there is a bijection
R
g−!R
such that if r 2R manipulates c and f(c), then g(r)2R manipulates f(c) and
if r 2R manipulates C, then g−1(r) manipulates C and f−1(C).
 Every pair c and f(c) is manipulated by some r 2R and every pair C is manipu-
lated by some r 2R.
Example 2.2. Let L be minimal propositional logic and let R be the usual natural
deduction rules [139]. Then the representation of proofs as typed -terms, with R
given by the usual rules of the typed -calculus, according to the propositions-as-types
correspondence [78] is type-theoretic.
Example 2.3. Let L be minimal propositional logic and let R be the usual natural
deduction rules [139]. Then the representation of proofs as texts generated by the usual
Hilbert-type system, i.e., axioms together with modus ponens, is not type-theoretic.
Examples 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that we can think of the relationship between proof-
objects and propositions as being generated locally in type-theoretic representations but
globally in non-type-theoretic representations.
Gentzen’s natural deduction is a suitable deduction system for intuitionistic logic (IL)
but appears less so for classical logic (CL) for which the Gentzen’s sequent calculus
seems better suited. In fact, the propositions-as-types correspondence allows us to natu-
rally annotate natural deductions with terms. For IL, the language of terms is the typed
-calculus, whereas for the sequent calculus it is not clear what are the appropriate
annotations and this lack leads to revisit natural deduction for CL. Although a recent
proposal, which consists of a variant of multiple-conclusioned natural deduction with
the so-called -calculus as the language of annotating terms [124], provides a term
language for classical logic, it does so by introducing to the classical sequent calculus
some of the asymmetries inherent in intuitionistic logic. The problem of naturally rep-
resenting within proof-objects the global symmetries inherent in classical logic whilst
retaining type-theoretic locality has been addressed, with limited success, by Girard
[61, 62] in his theory of proof nets for classical linear logic [63].
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Example 2.4. Classical multiplicative linear logic, with connectives ⊗, } and the invo-
lutive negation −?, can be described as a one-sided sequent calculus with judgements
‘  . We can annotate such consequences with proof nets and obtain a type-theoretic
presentation of linear logic. For example, in the annotated sequent
‘ (⊗  )⊗ ; ?} ?; ?;
 is (up to some Exchanges) the proof net
Whilst proof nets provide a global structure for proofs, they are generated locally, by
the ⊗, } and Axiom (and Cut) rules. It follows that our denition of type-theoretic
is satised.
The idea of annotating sequents of CL with a formulation of natural deduction
based on the -calculus has been adapted to classical linear logic (CLL) [18], thereby
providing a type-theoretic presentation of classical linear logic based on the -calculus.
Such a presentation retains type-theoretic locality at the price of the loss of some global
symmetry. Finally, we give an example which goes a little beyond the framework for
type-theoretic languages that we have introduced.
Example 2.5 (Bunched logic). BI, the logic of bunched implications [115, 116, 147],
uses sequents with antecedents structured not as lists but as bunches. Bunches have two
combining operations, \;" and \,". Dierent structural properties are specied for \;",
which admits weakening and contraction, and \,", which admits neither. This richer
sequential structure allows additive and multiplicative implications to live side-by-side,
without recourse to linear logic’s exponentials. Propositional BI’s proof-objects are
characterized by the -calculus. Predicate BI’s proof-objects require a dependently-
typed -calculus [86].
These examples illustrate that for a given logic, it is not always evident how to
dene representations of proofs that are type-theoretic. In this setting, the proposals of
new logics, to deal with new problems and applications, is strongly connected to the
design of new calculi to express proof-objects.
To include logics such as BI within our framework we should have to extend our
treatment of consequence relations to account for multiple combining operations.
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2.3. The model-theoretic view of type-theoretic languages
The Tarski-style semantics we have discussed so far can be generalized to encom-
pass algebraic and denotational models. The key idea is to interpret propositions, and
hence contexts, in a semantic structure, M, such as a set or a category which carries
some specied structure. Given interpretations [[ ]]M of a context   and [[]]M of a
proposition , we can ask whether there exists a map f in M such that
f : [[ ]]M 7! [[]]M:
If such a map exists, then we know that M j= [ ]. However, we can extend the
interpretation in a semantic structure to terms and ask if there exists an f such that
f= [[]]M, i.e., if M j= ( :)[ ]. Such a model is said to be type-theoretic.
Example 2.6 (Intuitionistic logic). Let L be the (^;)-fragment of intuitionistic
propositional logic, with the empty context denoted by hi and with proof-objects rep-
resented as terms of the simply typed -calculus. Let M be a cartesian closed category
(CCC). Then the following interpretation determines a type-theoretic model: rst, the
propositions,
[[hi]]M = 1
[[ ^  ]]M = [[]]M  [[ ]]M
[[  ]]M = [[ ]]M[[]]M
and second, in a simplied form, the proofs,
[[ ; x : ‘ x :]]M = [[ ; x :]]M
x−−−−−![[x :]]M
[[  ‘  ^	 : ^  ]]M = [[ ]]M
[[]]M[[	]]M−−−−−−![[]]M  [[ ]]M
[[  ‘ x ::	 :  ]]M = f 2 [[[ ]]M; [[  ]]M]
...
where f is a unique functional element which commutes with application (for which
the clause is omitted). Here j= dened by M j= ( :)[ ] i there is an f in M such
that [[]]M ’ f : [[ ]]M ! [[]]M (where ’ is Kleene equality).
Example 2.7 (Linear logic). Let L be the (⊗; − )-fragment of linear propositional
logic, with the empty context denoted by hi and with proof-objects represented as
terms of the simply typed linear -calculus [16]. Let M be a symmetric monoidal
closed category (SMCC). Then the following interpretation determines a type-theoretic
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model:
[[hi]]M = I
[[⊗  ]]M = [[]]M ⊗ [[ ]]M
[[−  ]]M = [[ ]]M[[]]M
with j= dened by M j= ( :)[ ] i there is an f in M such that (where ’ is
Kleene equality) [[]]M ’ f : [[ ]]M ! [[]]M.
Classical logic naturally provides a non-example.
Example 2.8 (Classical logic). Classical propositional consequences can be interpreted
in Boolean algebras but such a semantics is not type-theoretic: there is no way to
distinguish between dierent proofs of the same sequent in such a semantics.
We conclude this point with bunched logic.
Example 2.9 (Bunched logic). Models of propositional BI, including its proof-objects,
[116, 149, 147] are characterized by bicartesian doubly closed categories, i.e. categories
which enjoy two (symmetric) monoidal closed structures, one of which is cartesian,
and which also have co-products. A host of examples, relying on Day’s tensor product
construction [38], is provided by categories of presheaves over a (symmetric) monoidal
category C, i.e. SetC
op
. Of particular interest is the case in which C is a preordered
monoid, in which we obtain a Kripke-style forcing semantics. Such a semantics can
be extended to predicate BI [116, 147, 150].
In fact, these examples illustrate that for a given logic, in addition to the need of
appropriate proof representations, the search and denition of a type-theoretic model
is not a trivial work.
The semantic view we have sketched in this section is clearly motivated by cate-
gorical model theory. Our view essentially subsumes algebraic and truth conditional
formulations of semantics.
2.4. The propositions-as-types correspondence
So far we have considered what it is for presentation of a logical system to be
type-theoretic. However, a system of types has no a priori relationship with logic.
Barendregt [14] gives an extensive explanation, in both the Curry and Church styles,
of the point of view that types are syntactic entities which can be assigned to -terms
[15] in order to restrict function application.
We say that there is a propositions-as-types correspondence between a proof system
S for logic L and a type theory T just in case the following:
 Transition: Each proposition  of L can be interpreted as a type [] of T (the
transition  7! [] is often called the propositions-as-types correspondence).
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 Soundness: The transition  7! [] induces a transition   7! [ ] between contexts
in L and contexts in T and a transition  7! [] between proof-objects in L and
terms in T such that if  is a proof of   ‘L  in S, then [ ] ‘T [] : [] is
provable in T.
In addition, we may also have the following :
 Completeness: If there is a term M in T such that [ ] ‘T M : [] is provable in T,
then   ‘L  is provable in S.
Originally formulated, building on ideas of Curry, by de Bruijn and Howard [78]
for minimal propositional and predicate logic, the correspondence has been extended
to more complex, but essentially intuitionistic, systems by several authors; see, for
example, the references in [14]. More recently, the correspondence has been extended
to classical propositional and predicate logic by Parigot [123, 124, 101], to propositional
intuitionistic linear logic (see [166]) and to a bunched logic, combining linear and
intuitionistic predicate logics [116, 147], by Ishtiaq and Pym [86].
A good view of the propositions-as-types correspondence for minimal=intuitionistic
logic is given by the -cube [14], in which are represented eight -calculi (a la Church),
i, covering the possible dependencies between terms and types (terms depending on
terms or types and types depending on terms or types). For instance, in ! (simple
typed -calculus), one has terms depending on terms, in P (type dependent calculus)
one has types depending on terms, in 2 (second-order -calculus, system F [60]) one
has terms depending on types, in ! one has types depending on types. The other
calculi are combination of the previous features, for instance the calculus of construc-
tions (CC) [35] includes all these sort of dependencies. Therefore, we can consider this
calculus from a rst extension of second-order (or polymorphic) -calculus in order
to allow the binding of propositions (or types) schemas. This permits the denition
of connectives within this formalism. A second extension consists in adding a rst-
order part with quantication and abstraction on elements. With the correspondence,
this gives rst-order logic and higher-order as well, since implication plays the role of
a functional type. It stands in propositions-as-types correspondence to an L-cube of
eight logics Li, the correspondence being formulated uniformly for the eight systems.
For instance, higher-order predicate logic corresponds to CC (for which completeness
fails). Such a correspondence with logics well explains why some works on proof-
search in pure logics are essential in the setting of proof-theoretic languages. In fact,
rst- and second-order quantication and dependent types are naturally motivated by
the aim to be able to specify the terms-types dependencies and thus to have enough
power for logical specication of computations and proof systems as well as more
general predication, in an uniform way [82].
Much work has been devoted to the use of this propositions-as-types correspondence
in programming, with the general idea being to use some results to extract programs
from intuitionistic proofs [34]. This point of view has been generalized by Martin-Lof
who used the correspondence to develop a system that is at the same time a program-
ming language and a system dedicated to the development of intuitionistic mathematics
[102{104]. In comparison, the CC is very expressive but it is not always evident that
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one has a semantics for the program constructed with the functional calculus. In fact,
the choice of the system depends on the power and usefulness of both logics and cor-
responding languages. The question of making precise what would be the analogue in
terms of proofs (or -terms) of mechanisms used in programming (e.g., general recur-
sion) is important in this context. Moreover, one has to clarify the question of knowing
whether the complexity of mathematical proofs has some counterpart in programming.
It has been possible to design general or specic proof-search methods for such
expressive logics and frameworks, having in mind these strong connections between
the type systems and the logics (see for instance [7, 40, 73, 143, 151]). We aim from
now to illustrate the main points about proof-search in type-theoretic languages through
dierent logics or languages, like for instance the LF logical framework [72], based on
the in P-calculus, but the main concepts we present have to be dened or analysed
(generally in non-trivial way) in other so-called logical frameworks.
2.5. Logical frameworks
Type-theoretic languages are often described as \logical frameworks" but one has
to be careful about such claims. Following [72], we intend a logical framework to be
a meta-logic within which object-logics are represented. It follows that, in order to
describe a framework, one must provide the following:
1. A characterization of the class of (object-)logics to be represented. In the LF logical
framework [11, 72, 151], we are concerned with Hilbert type and natural deduction
systems (see [9] for denitions) which admit weakening and contraction. In RLF
[86], we are concerned just with natural deduction systems which do not necessarily
admit weakening and contraction. In the linear logical framework (LLF) [29, 31],
the intended class of object-logics has to be stated.
2. An appropriate meta-language. In LF, the meta-language is the -calculus, a system
of rst-order dependent function types in propositions-as-types correspondence with
rst-order minimal logic.
The -calculus is a formal system for deriving assertions of one of the following
shapes:
‘  sig  is a signature
‘   context   is a context
  ‘ K kind K is a kind
  ‘ A :K A has kind K
  ‘ M :A M has type A
where the syntax is specied by the following grammar:
Signatures  ::= hi j; c :K j; c :A
Contexts   ::= hi j ; x :A
Kinds K ::= Type jx :A:K
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Types A ::= c jx :A:B j x :A:B jAM
Objects M ::= c j x j x :A:M jMN
The -type specializes to ! in the absence of type-dependency.
Full details of the calculus and its metatheoretic properties can be found in
[11, 72, 140, 151]. The key points to note, in comparison with the simply-typed -
calculus, are that contexts are ordered from left to right according to dependency and
that abstraction and application, for the top-level judgement, are given by
 ; x :A ‘ M :B
  ‘ x :A:M :x :A:B I and
  ‘ M :x :A:B   ‘ N :A
  ‘ MN :B[N=x] E
The system is strongly normalizing, Church{Rosser and predicative; each of judgements
given above is decidable.
In the RLF logical framework, the meta-language is the -calculus, a system of
rst-order-dependent function types, with a full-linear-dependent function space, in
propositions-as-types correspondence with a rst-order minimal logic of bunched im-
plications [86, 116, 147]. The language of LLF [29] is a subsystem of -calculus,
lacking a linear dependent function space.
3. A characterization of the mechanism by which object-logics are represented. In
LF and RLF, the mechanism is judgements-as-types. In LLF [29], the intended
mechanism is not clearly characterized.
This point of view can be summarized by the following slogan:
Framework = Language + Representation:
Each of the previous points, which are interdependent, has an impact on the use of
the frameworks as formal theories of logics and as bases for formal theories of com-
putation in specied logics, such as a search-based model of computation like logic
programming.
2.5.1. Representation in logical frameworks
The judgements-as-types notion of representation is described for LF informally,
except for examples of particular systems, in [72, 11]. It is described more carefully in
[12] and, for RLF, in [86]. Following [144{146], it can be summarized as follows:
1. Consider object-logics as systems for deriving not bare propositions but rather judged
propositions. For example, intuitionistic predicate logic is formulated as a system for
deriving (or satisfying) judged propositions of the form proof () or alternatively,
as in [72], true(). Similarly, modal S4 is formulated using two judgements, as a
system for deriving judgements of the form true() and valid(). In both cases,
the systems have Kripke semantics in the usual style.
2. Consider a correspondence, with a denition similar to that of the propositions-as-
types correspondence, between judged propositions (in the object-logic) and types
in the language of the framework (constructed over a signature containing type-
constructors corresponding to each judgement form of the object-logic).
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With this formulation, LF’s representation of object-logics now goes as follows:
roughly speaking, LF is concerned with those Hilbert and natural deduction systems
for which the correspondence is uniform. The basic idea, inspired by [71], is that there
be a surjection from consequences
 : (X; J1(1); : : : ; Jm(m) ‘L J ());
in L, where  is the proof-object in L, to consequences
 X ; y1 : J1(1); : : : ; ym : Jm(m) ‘L M : J ();
in L.
We can observe [141, 86, 85] that linear logic and other relevant (or substructural)
logics cannot be uniformly encoded in LF. To obtain such an encoding it is necessary
to move to the RLF logical framework which, as described above, uses the -calculus,
together with judgements-as-types. ’s linear dependent function space can be used
to encode, for example, some of the \consumable preconditions" found in Hoare-like
program logics. This language with a judgements-as-types notion gives a framework
able to uniformly encode some linear and other relevant, or substructural, logics.
All of the logical frameworks we have considered so far have employed judgements-
as-types as their representation mechanism. Before proceeding to consider briey the
semantics of logical frameworks, we discuss some distinctions within the judgements-
as-types mechanism and also a dierent mechanism, called worlds-as-parameters:
 Judgements-as-types: A number of forms of representation, within the judgements-
as-types mechanism, have been discussed by Avron et al. [12]. Briey, they are as
follows:
 The most basic use of judgements-as-types is when the object-logic to be repre-
sented is described by a single consequence relation. Examples of such systems
include propositional and predicate classical and intuitionistic logics. Their encod-
ings in LF employ a single type-constructor,
true : o ! Type;
which takes a proposition  and returns a type true(). The inference rules of the
object-logic are then represented as constants of appropriate type. For example,
the _-elimination rule of intuitionistic propositional logic,
[] [ ]
...
...
 _   

is represented as follows:
_E :  : o: : o: : o:
true( _  )! (true()! true())! (true( )! true())! true()
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Other rules are represented similarly; see [86, 141, 151] for discussions of the
general form in LF and RLF.
 If the denition of an object-logic simultaneously uses two (or more) conse-
quence relations, then we can view the propositions of the logic as consisting
not merely of well-formed formulae but of pairs h; ji, where j denotes a choice
of consequence relation. Then the logic can be represented in LF by taking a
type-constructor j : o ! Type, for each consequence relation. For example, the
modal logic K uses two consequence relations, for truth and validity, and can be
represented using two judgements, true : o ! Type and valid : o ! Type.
 Worlds-as-parameters: A quite dierent representation mechanism, called worlds-
as-parameters, has been described by Avron et al. [12]. It is inspired by Kripke
models of modal logics [32]. For example, in a representation of a Hilbert-type
system for K, the basic idea is to parametrize the type-constructor corresponding
to the consequence relation for truth over a type U of \worlds", on which no
constructor is dened,
true :U ! o!Type:
This step allows the necessitation rule to be represented as
NEC : : o : (w :U (true(w)()))!w :U : true(w)( ):
The idea [12] is that if we make an assumption, then we must assume the exis-
tence of a world and to form the judgement at w. It follows that deriving a judge-
ment, which is universally quantied with respect to U , as a premiss amounts
to establishing the judgement for a generic world upon which no assumptions
are made. The Kripke idea of accessibility can be seen to arise via the inductive
construction of contexts formed in order to represent judgements [12].
 Constrained Assumptions: A third class of mechanisms, which are really just
variations on the basic judgements-as-types scheme, deals with a range of special
conditions
{ No assumptions: Logics such as K and its extensions employ a rule of ne-
cessitation which may be applied only to theorems. Rather than enforcing the
structure required for such a rule via two consequence relations, one can in-
troduce a \no assumptions" judgement,
Na : : o:true()!Type;
and work with a single consequence relation represented by the type-constructor
true.
{ Boxed assumptions: Prawitz’s natural deduction presentation of S4 includes
the -introduction rule,
18 D. Galmiche, D.J. Pym /Theoretical Computer Science 232 (2000) 5{53
I
 
...


;
the application of which we must restrict to proofs in which all assumptions
are essentially modal. This restriction is represented using a judgement
Bx : : o:true()!Type;
which allows the representation of -introduction as the constant
I : : o :d : true():(Bx()(d))! (true( )):
Other variations along the lines of \boxed assumptions" are \closed assump-
tions" and \boxed fringe": All of these employ judgements which constrain the
logics consequence relations [12], just as in the examples above.
We remark that [12] is concerned mainly with providing systematic treatments of
object-logics described as systems for truth and object-logics described as systems
for validity, rather than with dierent choices of representation mechanism, so that the
organization of the ideas in [12] is dierent from ours.
2.5.2. Semantics of logical frameworks
We have already explained that a logical framework should be regarded as follows:
Framework = Language + Representation:
In consideration of a semantics for a logical framework | here we restrict our attention
to LF, RLF [86] being beyond our present scope | we can see from the discussion
above that there are three requirements that it must satisfy:
(1) It must provide a semantics for the type theory as a theory of functions.
(2) It must provide an account of the propositions-as-types correspondence between
the type theory and its internal logic, and the judgements-as-types correspondence
for ‘uniform’ encodings.
(3) It must provide a semantics for the notion of logic programming induced by search
in the language of the framework.
For the rst requirement (1) we must have a semantics for dependent types with
dependent function spaces that, for example, properly extends the ideas of Mitchell and
Moggi [112]. We must also have Kripke=Beth=Joyal models of the f; 8g-fragment
of minimal rst-order logic. For the second requirement (2), we must consider the
correspondence between Kripke models of an object-logic and Kripke models of the
encoding of that logic in the meta-logic. For the third requirement (3), we must at
least be able to identify a class of Herbrand models and be able to provide a least
xed point construction corresponding, as usual, to resolution. We return to the third
requirement in more detail in Section 3.4.
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We can satisfy requirements (1){(3) within the setting of indexed, or bred, cate-
gory theory [121, 87]. Suppose we have a category E where the propositions will be
interpreted. We index E for the purposes of interpreting the type theory. First, we index
it by a Kripke \world" structure W. This is to let the functor category [W;E] have
enough strength to model the f!; 8g-fragment of the internal logic and so correspond
to Kripke-style models for intuitionistic logic.
(An aside: In the setting of the relevant, or substructural, type theory presented by
Ishtiaq and Pym [86], we must further index [W;E] by a resource monoid R. Thus,
we obtain R-indexed sets of Kripke functors fJr:[W;E] j r 2Rg. We remark that the
separation of worlds from resources considered in this structure emphasizes a sort of
\phase shift" [61, 76].)
We now consider how to model the propositions and so explicate the structure of E.
The basic judgement of the internal logic of the type theory is (X ) ‘ , that  is
a proposition in the context  over the context X . One reading of this judgement,
and perhaps the most natural, is to see X as an index for the propositional judgement
 ‘ . This reading can be extended to the type theory, where, in the basic judgement
 ‘M :A,   can be seen as an index for M :A or that M :A depends on   for its
meaning. Thus, we are led to using the technology of indexed category theory. More
specically, in the case of the type theory, the judgement  ‘M :A is modelled as
the arrow 1
<M =−! <A= in the bre over < = in the strict indexed category E :Dop !V,
where V is a category of \values".
We remark that this is not the only technique for modelling a typing judgement; Cart-
mell [28], Pitts [138] and several other authors use a more \one-dimensional" structure
which relies on the properties of certain classes of maps to model type-dependency and
dependent function spaces. These are essentially equivalent to the indexed approach but
the latter is appealing for the main reason that it provides a technical separation of
conceptually separate issues. (Moreover, indexed techniques seem better suited to gen-
eralizations concerned with weaker type theories [86].) For instance, at a logical level,
the base and bres deal, respectively, with terms and propositions.
Nevertheless, these ideas owe much to work of Cartmell [28], Pitts [138], Seely
[160], Streicher [167] and others. We take a Kripke prestructure to be a functor
J : [W; [Dop;V]];
where W is a small category (of worlds), Dop =
∐
W D
op
W , where W ranges over the
objects ofW, and each DW (the base at W ) is small; V, a subcategory of the category
of small categories, Cat, is a category of values such that:
1. Each DW has a terminal object, 1DW .
2. Each J(W )(D) has a terminal object, 1J(W )(D), preserved on the nose by each
f(= J(W )(f)), where E f−! D2DW .
3. For each W 2W, D2DW and A2J(W )(D), there is a D  A2DW together
with canonical projections D  A pD; A−! D, 1J(W )(DA) qD; A−! pD;A(A) and canonical
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pullbacks
satisfying the strictness conditions that 1D(A)=A and 1D  A=1DA, for each A
in J(W )(D), and that g(fA)= (g;f)A and (g  (fA)); (f  A)= (g;f)  A,
for each appropriate A, f and g. Moreover, for each W and D, D  1J(W )(D) =D.
4. At each W , the arrow pD;A(= J(W )(pD;A)) has a right adjoint,
pD;A a D;A :J(W )(D  A)! J(W )(D)
satisfying the following (strict) Beck-Chevalley condition: for each E
f−! D in DW ,
each A in J(W )(D) and each B in J(W )(D  A),
f(D;AB) = E;fA((f  A)B) and
(f  A)(app(A; B)) = app(fA; (f  A)B);
where app is the co-unit of the adjunction. Thus  interprets the dependent function
space.
To get a Kripke structure KJ for  we must move from the category of values V
to a (weak) arrow construction ~V on V (see below), so that KJ : [W; [Dop; ~V]].
A Kripke model of  is then given as a pair hKJ; [[−]]−KJi, where [[−]]−KJ is a partial
function that interprets the syntax of  in KJ (so that we must require that KJ has
\enough points" to interpret the constants in ).
In fact, prestructures would be an adequate basis for dening models that would sat-
isfy requirement (1). We dene the following notion of satisfaction of the inhabitation
of a type A (intended to be of kind Type, i.e., not of the form x :A : B) by an object
M with respect to context   at world W : let  be a signature, KJ : [W; [Dop; ~V]] be
a Kripke --model and let   be a context, A be a type and M be an object. 2 In
the model KJ, the world W satises the inhabitation of A by M with respect to  ,
i.e.,
W j=KJ (M :A)[ ];
if and only if we have that [[ ]]WKJ , [[A ]]
W
KJ
and [[M ]]WKJ are dened and that
1KJ(W )([[ ]]
W
KJ)
[[M ]]WKJ−! [[A ]]WKJ in KJ(W )([[ ]]WKJ).
2 The types, objects and contexts considered here are required only to be members of the raw syntactic
categories.
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We are then able to obtain, inter alia, the following familiar-looking properties (all
of which are subject to requirements that interpretations [[−]]−KJ be suitably dened at
appropriate worlds | with no \relativization"):
 Monotonicity: Let  be a signature and let hKJ; [[−]]−KJi, where KJ : [W; [Dop; ~V]],
be a Kripke --model. If W j=KJ (M :A)[ ] and if W ! W 0, then W 0 j=KJ
(M :A)[][ ]. 3
 -forcing: Let  be a signature and let hKJ; [[−]]−KJi, where KJ : [W; [Dop; ~V]], be
a Kripke --model. W j=KJ (M :x :A : B)[ ] if and only if, for all W ! W 0
and for all N such that W 0 j=KJ (N :A)[][ ], there is a P such that W 0 j=KJ
(P :B[N=x])[][ ] and P = MN . Similarly for the non-dependent function
space, !.
 Soundness: Let  be a signature and let hKJ; [[−]]−KJi, where KJ : [W; [Dop; ~V]], be
a Kripke --model. If   ‘ M :A is provable, then W j=KJ (M :A)[ ], at each
W for which all the required interpretations are dened.
 Model existence: There is a Kripke---model hKJT ; [[−]]−KJTi with a world W0
such that if   6 ‘ M :A, then W0 6j=KJT (M :A)[ ].
 Completeness: If   j= M :A | i.e., satisfaction at all worlds in all models |
holds, then   ‘ M :A is provable.
However, for requirements (ii) and (iii), structures are exploited. The basic idea is
as follows: a structure is obtained from a prestructure by replacing the category of
\types" over a world and \context" by a chosen category of arrows from the base.
Corresponding to structures, we can dene the following satisfaction predicate, which
is a generalization of the one above:
W j=)KJ (
hM1 ;:::;Mni−! )[ ];
i.e., in the Kripke --model KJ, W forces 
hM1 ;:::;Mni−!  with respect to  . The
following can then be obtained:
(a) A semantics of  as a theory of functions. Such a theory requires just prestruc-
tures.
(b) Semantic accounts of propositions-as-types and of judgements-as-types for uniform
LF encodings. Such a theory exploits structures, rather than just prestructures, so
that we can interpret consequences relative to a given context. The idea is that a
sequent (X ) ‘  of a logic L, with proof-object , will hold at world W in a
model KJ, just in case we have that
W j=)KJL ( 
! A)[ X ];
where  X is the context representing the rst-order (say) variables X ,   is the
context representing the propositional assumptions , A is the type representing
the proposition  and  is the realizer representing the proof-object .
3 The superscript −[] should be read as \after ".
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(c) A least xed point semantics (see, for example, [77]) of logic programming with
the -calculus, i.e., requirement (3). Such a semantics is an essential starting point
for understanding logic programming with a formal metatheory; it relies directly
on the semantics of  we have presented.
The details of the ideas described in this section can be found in [141, 144{
146, 86]. We discuss how our models satisfy requirement (iii) in Section 3.4.
All these points and requirements about logical frameworks from both representation
and semantics points of view well illustrate the necessary and dicult work to dene
appropriate and useful frameworks to represent and encode logics. It implies serious
research about semantics foundations with relationships with category theory.
To conclude this section on logical frameworks, we insist upon the dierence between
the framework and its language. Frameworks such as LF or RLF are mainly used to
represent and encode logics or deductive systems and to consider meta-theorems about
these systems.
We have previously mentioned the -calculus as an annotation language but we
could also think about the status of such a calculus as the language of a classical
logical framework. There are answers, but they require careful consideration of how
one should represent systems in -calculus.
3. Proof-search in type-theoretic languages
3.1. From deduction to construction (or reduction)
Following in the Aristotelian tradition, modern symbolic logic has focussed on de-
duction as the primary proof-theoretic notion: Given a collection of assumptions, we
construct their consequences by applying rules of inference to established propositions
in order to establish more propositions.
There is, however, an alternative proof-theoretic notion, namely proof-search: Given
a sequent, we attempt to construct a proof of it by applying inference rules as reduction
operators, from conclusion to premisses, in order to repeatedly simplify the problem.
For example, consider the sequent ;   ;   ‘  ^ . This consequence does
indeed hold, and can be established as follows:
...
;   ;   ‘  L
;   ‘  Axiom ;   ;  ‘  Axiom
;   ;   ‘  L
;   ;   ‘  ^  ^ R
Here we see an intermediate stage in the construction of a proof. The rst step is
to break up the conjunction  ^  on the right. Following the right-hand branch, we
choose to do a L, using  , thereby creating two axioms. The left-hand branch,
here undeveloped, is completed similarly.
From the computational point of view, we have glossed over several important issues
here. For example:
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 We chose to develop the right-hand branch rst. Alternatively, we could have chosen
the left-hand one rst, or developed them together, \in parallel". In more complex
situations, a parallel execution can be very attractive, yet requires communication
between the processes which calculate each branch.
 At each inference, we chose a proposition to reduce: for example, on the right-hand
branch, we chose to reduce, using L,   rather than   .
An algorithm to calculate proofs, or decide putative consequences, must make such
choices: it must resolve the non-determinism that is inherent in the problem. This
highlights a view of logic which has emerged from such computational concerns, sum-
marized by the slogan
Logic = Inference + Control :
Thus, the nature of the reasoning determined by a system of logic depends not only on
the inference rules (or indeed the satisfaction relation) but also on the regime which
controls their use. These issues are very clearly seen in the logic programming language
Prolog [59].
So algorithmic proof-search, in which a specic procedure for constructing a proof
is given, is a fundamental enabling technology throughout computing science. Many
problems are formulated as judgements about formal texts, ranging from familiar ques-
tions about logical consequence and well-formedness to type-checking in programming
languages, parsing and compilation, whose solutions are determined by searching for
derivations of such judgements.
3.2. Proof-search in classical and non-classical logics
There is a substantial and long-standing body of theory which addresses the problem
of searching proofs in classical propositional and predicate logics. Many of these tech-
niques have been extended to modal logics, intuitionistic logic and higher-order logic.
As explained in Section 2.4, the aim of using powerful logical languages or frameworks
leads one to consider such classical or non-classical logics, as well as other logics,
such as (classical) linear logic [62] in which proofs are not considered to be func-
tions but rather are read as actions. Before considering proof-search in type-theoretic
languages and its impact on programming, it is important to consider proof-search in
the underlying logics. One can start from known methods for classical logic and adapt
them to non-classical logics like intuitionistic, modal or linear, with proof-search there
being considered as a perturbation of classical search. But the consequences of the
resulting proof-search methods, concerning complexity, implementation diculty and
understanding, are dicult to estimate a priori.
To reduce non-determinism in proof-search, one can use calculi that have cer-
tain structural advantages from the point of view of mechanization; leading exam-
ples are Gentzen’s sequent calculi. Moreover, in addition to the design of proofs
of cut-elimination, proof-search motivates the denition and the use of single- or
multiple-conclusion sequent calculi for a given logic. It is important to notice that while
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natural deduction systems are appropriate for propositions-as-types correspondence but,
a priori, much less so for proof-search. In rst-order logic, one can eliminate the non-
determinism in term-instantiation for an existential quantier using Herbrand’s theorem
and unication. Even if Herbrand’s theorem cannot be applied directly to most log-
ics, such as intuitionistic, linear or modal logics, this non-determinism can often be
eliminated via other procedures [94].
Another level of non-determinism has to do with the order in which rules are applied
and, in many sequent calculi, order of rules is crucial for the success of the proof-search
process. The permutability results of a sequent calculus indicate when the order of two
inference rules can be permuted without invalidating a proof and are used to reduce
the non-determinism on the ordering of rules applications. Moreover, optimizations can
be based on the reduction of the amount of backtracking in the proof-search as well
illustrated in [94]. It is important to notice that a way to solve proof-search problems,
such as the occurrence of loops in the search procedure, consists in proposing new
sequent calculi, the rules of which integrate the solution mechanisms [42].
In this section, we briey review some of the key aspects of some of the most
important techniques of proof-search. Typically, the techniques we described were de-
veloped in the absence of any attempt to develop a general theory of proof-search, i.e.,
a theory comparable to that which obtains for deduction. Moreover, these techniques
typically do not exploit type-theoretic presentations of the logic to which they apply.
3.2.1. Resolution and unication
Robinson’s introduction of the resolution procedure [156] marks perhaps the be-
ginning of the theory of proof-search. Resolution is a refutationally complete theorem
proving method. Consider a rst-order formula  for which we aim to test validity. We
rst negate it and then try to skolemize : getting a formula of the form 8x1 : : : xn:
where  is a conjunction of clauses C1; C2; : : : ; Cm. Then  is valid if and only if
there is a nite set S of closed instances of clauses Ci; 16 i6m, that is unsatisable.
It corresponds to deducing the empty clause from S by the resolution and factoring
rules. Resolution on ground clauses is a version of the cut rule restricted to atomic
formulae and factoring is an instance of weakening. In fact, the main invention was to
design unication, which can be seen as a device of interleaving the identication of
suitable ground instances of clauses and the demonstration of their unsatisability.
This method has been extended to higher-order logic by Huet through the proposal
of a semi-decision algorithm for higher-order unication (unication in the simply
typed -calculus !) [81]. In spite of the undecidability of the problem, it has many
applications in theorem proving, type inference and program transformation. Unication
algorithms have been proposed for  by Elliot [44] and Pym [152, 143, 151] and
have a signicant impact in two main ways: such an algorithm allows to do automated
theorem proving in LF’s encoded logics but also to turn the  type-checking algorithm
into a type-checking and term-inference algorithm for the encoded languages [22]. But
the drawbacks of non-determinism and undecidability, inherent in the simply-typed
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case, were inherited by these algorithms. Therefore a deterministic, though incomplete,
unication algorithm has been also proposed, which is based on a restriction of the
occurrences of variables in simply typed -terms [132] and was generalized for the
CC. More recent work deals with similar higher-order unication in case of the linear
simply typed -calculus [30].
In this setting, we mention generic resolution, also called the inverse method, orig-
inally developed by Maslov and Mints [110], a forward-chaining proof-search method.
Search starts with the set of axioms and produces new sequents from the already de-
rived ones by applying the sequent calculus rules in a \downwards" direction until one
eventually derives the formula to prove [164]. In fact, the main ideas of the general
resolution framework for logics with sub-formula property are (i) to label sub-formulae
(of the formula to prove) with new atomic formulae in order to reduce the depth of a
formula and (ii) to start search with maximally general axioms and builds unication
into derivation rules. As for Robinson resolution, unication is an essential idea. This
general method has been developed in the case of intuitionistic logic [164] and linear
logic [111].
Strategies for using resolution have been proposed, including subsumption, which
preserves the completeness of the method, and inversion, based on invertible rules in
the logic. For some kinds of formulae, we can see that it is possible to allow only a
single rule to be applied. It is the basis of the so-called reduction strategy for which
a general schema for the resolution method was proposed in [168]. Such strategy has
been adapted for linear logic and led to a linear resolution prover [163].
3.2.2. Methods based on matrices
Three main types of redundancy were identied within a search space induced by
a classical cut-free sequent calculus: (i) notational (duplication of redundant informa-
tion), (ii) irrelevance (reductions that do not advance the search towards nding a
proof) and (iii) non-permutability (derivations that dier in the order in which rules
are applied) [170]. Building on resolution, several techniques based on tableaux, con-
nections [17, 170] or matings [6] were introduced rst for classical logic and then
modal and intuitionistic logics to remove if possible such redundancies. As an exam-
ple, we consider the matrix (i.e., connections or matings) methods of Andrews [6],
Bibel [17] and Wallen [170]. The basic idea is simple and elegant. Consider, draw-
ing on [170], the following classical sequent, which is provable in the Gentzen’s [58]
classical sequent calculus, LK,
‘ (  )^ (  ) ( )
A matrix characterization of validity introduces appropriate theoretical structures and
techniques for removing the above mentioned redundancies. One deals with the nota-
tional problem via the notions of formula tree and positions and with irrelevance via
the notions of path, polarity and connection. As well explained in [170], the set of
paths through a formula  represents the set of sequents from which any derivation of
the end sequent ‘  can be constructed. A necessary condition for a path to represent
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an initial sequent is to contain a connection: two atomic formulae occurrences with
the same predicate symbol and with dierent polarities. A search for the connections
in the paths is a direct search of a set of initial sequents from which ‘  is derivable.
When every path through a formula contains a connection, one says that the set of
connections spans the formula. For propositional logic, there is no permutability prob-
lem (internal structure of derivation is irrelevant), the existence of a spanning set of
connections for  is equivalent to the classical validity of  (or the existence of a
sequent proof for ‘ ).
Let us return to our example to illustrate the structures used in such a character-
ization. A signed formula is a pair h; ni where  is a formula and n2f0; 1g is
its polarity and such formulae are classied through dierent types (for propositional
logic, conjunctive or -type and disjunctive or -type) considering the following uni-
form notation:
 1 2
h^  ; 1i h; 1i h ; 1i
h_  ; 0i h; 0i h ; 0i
h!  ; 0i h; 1i h ; 0i
h:; 1i h; 0i h; 0i
h:; 0i h; 1i h; 1i
 1 2
h^  ; 0i h; 0i h ; 0i
h_  ; 1i h; 1i h ; 1i
h!  ; 1i h; 0i h ; 1i
If  is the formula to be proven, then we consider the signed formula h; 0i. Then
one decomposes this signed formula into signed sub-formulae following the previous
uniform notation and therefore forms an indexed formula tree where the nodes are
positions k with labels lab(k) that are the sub-formulae and a polarity. A position is
associated a principal type and a secondary type. The former (-type or -type) is
dened from its polarity and its label and the latter by the principal type of its parent
in the tree. This information, for our example, is conveniently summarized as follows:
u pol(u) lab(u) Ptype(u) Stype(u)
a0 0 (  )^ (  ) ( )  {
a1 1 (  )^ (  )  1
a2 1    1
a3 0  { 1
a4 1  { 2
a5 1     2
a6 0  { 1
a7 1  { 2
a8 0    2
a9 1  { 1
a10 0  { 2
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A path through h; 0i is a subset of the positions of its formula tree dened from
the principal  and  types. After a reduction of a path we obtain an atomic path only
composed by atomic positions. In our example, the atomic paths are the following:
fa3; a6; a9; a10g; fa4; a6; a9; a10g; fa3; a7; a9; a10g; fa4; a7; a9; a10g.
A connection is a pair of atomic positions in a path labelled with identical atomic
formulas of dierent polarities. Here one has a set of connections f(a3; a9); (a4; a6);
(a7; a10)g that spans the initial formulae because each atomic path contains such a
connection. Then the initial sequent is classically provable. Then proof-search corre-
sponds in this setting to nd connections that span the formula.
In rst-order logic, the internal structure of derivations is important since the existen-
tial quantier rules (9L; 8R) are constrained by the eigenvariable condition. Therefore,
one needs a mapping to represent the coherence of the choices of terms (substituted to
free variables) to obtain a connection. Such a connection is called a complementary
connection. Such mappings induce reduction orderings that represent the constraints
on the order in which rules have to be applied. The mappings for which reduction
orderings are irreexive (i.e., consistent with the structure of the formula) are called
admissible mappings. Moreover, one introduces a notion of multiplicity that indicates
how many instances of particular sub-formulae may occur in a derivation. This leads
one to work with formulae indexed with a multiplicity. Then the existence of a multi-
plicity and of a set of connections which spans , and which are complementary under
an admissible mapping, is equivalent to the rst-order validity of . Let us mention
that unication can be used to compute the appropriate admissible mappings. Its role
consists in ensuring the existence of a correct order of rule applications to produce a
proof.
Wallen has also developed this method for non-classical logics like the modal logics
and the intuitionistic logic [170]. The proof-theoretic basis is a multiple-conclusioned
sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic that diers only from the classical calculus in
three so-called special rules. For these rules, the succedent of the premiss is restricted to
the side-formula of the rule, whereas in the classical rules, the succedent may contain
multiple formulae in the succedent [41]. Such special rules induce a sort of non-
permutability. The matrix characterization for intuitionistic logic is based on adaptation
of the notions used for classical logic. Concerning the complementarity, one associates
with each position of the formula tree a sequence of positions called a prex that
encodes the context of that position with respect to the special positions. In fact, the use
of prexes is a syntactic way of taking into account semantic information. Therefore,
the complementarity for connections is dened in terms of the prexes of the atomic
positions, from the notion of intuitionistic admissible mappings (or substitutions) that
allow to unify prexes of connections. A similar approach can be taken for various
modal logics.
In fact, the matrix characterizations are not rivals to resolution methods. Rather, the
later can be seen as a combination of a matrix inference system and particular search
strategies encoded in the syntax of the object language.
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3.2.3. Which method?
Such a characterization can be generalized as to nd a matrix M and a substitution
 such that every path in the matrix M is inconsistent (i.e., contains a formula and
its negation). There are dierent ways of constructing such a matrix and checking
its paths. The way, in the tableaux method can be seen as a construction of the
skeleton of a sequent calculus derivation and of nding a substitution  that makes the
skeleton a derivation. In intuitionistic logic some complications come from the absence
of prenex and Skolem normal forms. Moreover, as an alternative to the connection
method, Voronkov [169] proposes a characterization based on derivation skeletons and
constraints satisfaction and a study of the problem of the instantiations of a skeleton
to valid derivations with some complexity results. This idea to use constraints instead
of substitutions, used in dierent areas of deduction (unication, semantics) seems
interesting for further developments.
These dierent points illustrate the possible characterizations of provability in a given
logic and their corresponding proof-search methods. A common view is to consider
provability search from a skeleton of derivation (for instance, a formula tree) and
some constraints to satisfy (for instance, complementarity of connections), the right
denitions of these notions depending on the logic with which one deals. Moreover,
one can either x a general methodology (or a unifying framework) for the common
study of logics (for instance, relevant, or substructural, logics) and their interactions
(non-classical search viewed as a perturbation of classical one) or develop from the
specic proof-theoretic properties of the logic, new tailored methods. Proof-search in
linear logic is a good example of such a dilemma because this logic cannot be con-
sidered, from dierent points of view (proof-theoretic, resource-sensitivity, semantics,
applications), only as a next and direct renement of classical and intuitionistic log-
ics, mainly when one considers more than the multiplicative fragment (for instance
the additive connectives). Therefore, attempts to provide a taxonomy of logics and
techniques are important and are today motivated by a desire to develop logical sys-
tems tailored to the needs of specic applications. Labelled deductive systems (LDS)
[37] provide some foundations of such an approach and brings out the common struc-
tures underlying dierent logical systems. In this approach, one uses labelled formulae,
expressions of the form a :, where  is a formula and a is a term of a labelling
language or algebra. In fact, one can consider the algebraic interpretation of sequents
to deal with semantic consequence relations which could, under suitable circumstances,
be reformulated in terms of \labelled refutation systems" and so lead to generaliza-
tions of classical tableaux in which the semantics is, in a sense, incorporated into the
syntax. For instance, starting from a sequent one can generate a proof tree with labels
which include semantic information, such as Kripke worlds. Provability (respectively
non-provability) in a given relevant or substructural logic is then established by satis-
fying (respectively not satisfying) the semantic constraints given by the labels at the
leaves, with respect to the provability conditions.
It is clear that relevant, or substructural, logics can be seen as being proof-theoreti
cally motivated and their syntax seems to be better understood than their semantics.
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Intuitionistic logic is a good illustration about it even if its model theory is more
developed than for weaker substructural logics. It appears that new improvements on
proof-search will be based on a better understanding and manipulation of classical se-
mantics (algebraic, Kripke-style) or new semantics (phase semantics, coherence spaces,
games models).
3.2.4. What degree of automation?
An important aim consists in automating proof-search in such logics as much as pos-
sible, to avoid tedious work and to focus on important choices. Then, theorem provers
and underlying proof-search procedures can be based for instance on the denition of
appropriate proof-schemas, such as uniform proofs [109] or normal proofs [57], that
are complete with respect to provability. But one could also prefer to develop proofs
semi-automatically, with some choices about reducing non-determinism (principal for-
mula, rule to apply) made by the user of the proof system. In interactive theorem
provers, such as LCF [128] or Isabelle [131], where one can encode many logics and
then develop proofs of meta-theorems in such logics, one can dene strategies from
well-dened notions of tactics and tacticals. In the context of type-theoretic languages
and the use of type theory for programming, where we focus more on the proof-object,
we observe that an interactive approach allows to take into account more operational
parameters during the proof design. But it is clear that when one is able to dene
appropriate proof plans (from tactics or strategies) to automatically construct some
classes of proofs, it is natural to integrate them into a proof-search procedure.
3.2.5. Proofs-as-objects
The proof-search process is at present (and will be more and more) inuenced by
the specic applications of interest (design of logical systems tailored to their needs),
by the integration in actual proof environments (unied framework for various logics
or interaction between specic proof methods) and by the analysis of the proof-search
(complexity, non-provability, interface). It is the same in the context of type-theoretic
languages, but with an emphasis on the proof-object that strongly depends on the logical
fragment and on the proof-search method.
In our last example, the resulting proof-object is a set of connections or matrices
from which it is possible to reconstruct the corresponding sequent proofs. Therefore
some question arises: Is such proof-object (or proof representation) obtained by an
ecient method, type-theoretic? If not; how to dene proof-search methods that di-
rectly generate type-theoretic proof-objects? What are the proof-objects that we want
to manipulate inside an implementation of a proof system; such as an automatic the-
orem prover or logic programming language, based on such ecient methods? Surely
a user of such a system will expect to be able to inspect a proof in, say, the sequent
calculus rather than a collection of matings? To address this problem, reconstruction
procedures are proposed to nally obtain corresponding sequent proofs [159]. But, in
some cases, one could perhaps mix the search for provability (via connections) with
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a direct construction of proof-objects. The nal form of proof-object is also important
consideration in the design of a theorem prover: it can inuence the form (among the
many possible choices) of user interface [20].
3.3. Proof-search in type-theoretic languages: basics
Whilst proof-search in logical systems in general is, essentially, concerned with the
problem of trying to construct a proof of a sequent   ‘ , in which each of  
and  may contain indeterminates (or \logical variables"). In type-theoretic settings,
one typically tries to construct a proof of a sequent   ‘  : in which, as we have
described in Section 2,  denotes a proof-object for the sequent   ‘  and in which
each of  ;  and  may contain indeterminates. Consequently, in the type-theoretic
setting the search space of proofs is constrained by : we consider just those proofs
of the shape determined by  (of course,  may just be an indeterminate, in which
case the constraint is trivial).
The shift to the type-theoretic point of view has a useful consequence. It can be
argued that, from an essentially combinatorial point of view, the search space deter-
mined by classical sequent calculus, LK, underlies the search spaces for other logics
or systems [91, 141, 154, 155]. Given this point of view, a natural question is the fol-
lowing: How can the classical search space be used as a basis for proof-search in
non-classical logics? The paper by Ritter; Pym and Wallen, in this volume, addresses
this question in detail for propositional intuitionistic logic. The basic idea is as fol-
lows: (i) work with the presentation of classical logic as the -calculus, introduced by
Parigot [124]. Such a presentation can be seen as LK annotated with a class of -terms
which include structural or control operators; (ii) consider a multiple-conclusioned pre-
sentation of intuitionistic logic, such as that given by Dummett [41]; (iii) search for
proofs of chosen endsequents using the full power of LK. Having obtained a proof,
examine the -term with which it is annotated to decide whether an intuitionistically
valid proof has been determined. These techniques have been applied to classical and
intuitionistic resolution by Ritter, Pym and Wallen in [141]. But what can we deduce
from these results about the real impact of -calculus as a proof-object language?
It seems that an interesting outstanding question is whether it would be possible to
have general or generic proof-objects usable for classical, intuitionistic and linear logics
and to analyse, from the structure of such proof-objects, the provability in one logic
from the provability in another. An example, in which a characterization of cases in
which classical provability entails intuitionistic provability, is provided by Nadathur’s
paper, in this volume. Moreover, it would be interesting to nd ways of characterizing
which are the more useful sorts of proof-objects for such a programme. For example,
we know that classical provability can be used to determine intuitionistic provability
via -terms but what about other types of proof-object, such as proof nets? In a recent
work, a similar approach for intuitionistic provability has been developed in the case of
linear logic by proposing labelled sequent calculi [13]. The use of labelled proof nets
and the adaptation of related algorithms for proof nets construction [53, 55] allow to
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propose a method for linear intuitionistic provability that is complete. But what about
the denition and the use of proof nets for other logics?
In fact, proof-search can be analysed from an initial proof-theoretic point of view
with studies of permutability of inference rules and of proof transformations. Then from
the proof-search point of view, some choices can be xed, leading to normal forms
(canonical [57] or uniform [109]) of proofs that are complete for provability. Such
methods for classical logic are often directly adapted (or specialized) to intuitionistic
logic, considering it as a restriction of classical logic. For such an adaptation, multiple-
conclusioned sequent calculi for intuitionistic logic (as specializations of classical ones)
are used in order to benet from the classical search space [42, 154, 155, 170]. It is
also interesting to study specic methods directly tailored for intuitionistic logic [42].
Studies of proof-search in relevant or substructural logics, such as linear logic,
are often based on such results but with some specic restrictions; see, for exam-
ple, [4, 56, 57, 141]. For a more detailed example, there have recently been attempts
to develop connection methods for linear logic. One possibility is to extend the pre-
vious works on intuitionistic logic and then to keep uniformity inside a global proof-
environment for constructive logics [92]. An alternative proposal comes from a direct
analysis of proof nets and proposes, after dening a connection-based characterization,
to use a proof net construction method in LL to derive a new connection method (see
Galmiche’s paper, in this volume). In this setting, the proof-object is not only a set
of connections but also a proof net (and also possibly the derived sequent proof). The
generality of such techniques, based on new semantic structures such as proof nets,
remains to be understood: Are similar analyses possible for other relevant or sub-
structural logics? Can such techniques be integrated into logical frameworks such as
LF [11, 72, 151, 141] or RLF [86]?
As one can see proof-search in non-classical logics as a perturbation of classical
search, one can also consider, inside a non-classical logic, proof-search in some sub-
fragments from this perturbation (or specialization) point of view. For instance, the non-
commutative linear logic, that seems suitable for various applications, is in fact linear
logic without the commutativity property for the consequence relation for which specic
semantics and proof systems have been proposed [2]. But can proof-search methods in
this fragment be derived from the ones in commutative case or must tailored techniques
be developed? In the case of proof-search based on proofs nets, one can naturally use
the initial algorithm, designed for the commutative case, with a specialization of one
specic procedure [54], but what about sequent calculi and natural deduction systems?
Proposals for new decision procedures in a given logic are often based on new
sequent calculi that directly integrate some operational choices at the levels of for-
mula management manipulation and of proof development. For instance, to avoid some
loops in the proof-search in propositional intuitionistic logic, Dyckho has proposed
a contraction-free sequent calculus, exploiting the invertibility of some rules in order
to reduce the amount of backtracking during proof-search [42]. In addition, a calculus
for refutation that generates counter-models has been proposed [136]. These aspects
illustrate the importance not only of proving formulae but also of justifying failing to
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prove a formula by giving evidence of non-provability, such as a counter-model. In
such an approach, small application-specic models could usefully inuence the design
of refutation systems in a logic [162].
3.4. Proof-search in logical frameworks
We have explained (Section 2.5) that a logical framework should be understood to
consist of a language together with a mechanism for representing logics. Although, from
this point of view, there has to-date been very little work published on proof-search
in logical frameworks, we speculate as to what such a theory might look like.
In [151, 143], it was shown that the language  admits a natural interpretation as a
logic programming language, based on a calculus U of sequents of the form  ) A(),
where  is an indeterminate. Such sequents are interpreted as requests to calculate terms
M and N such that   ‘ M :A[N=] is provable. Here N corresponds to the usual notion
of answer substitution, intended to be calculated by unication [151, 143, 152, 45]. A
alternative formulation of logic programming for , the language of LF, has been
presented by Pfenning [132].
From the semantic point of view, it is useful to formulate a resolution calculus for
-realizations,   −!. The following resolution calculus, R, relies, for its complete-
ness property with respect to the usual calculi for , on a certain clausal form for
types [140, 141, 151]:
Axiom
‘   h@1 ; :::;@ni−! 
each @i 2[ ; (1)
Resolution
‘   hM1 ;:::;Mi ;:::;Mni−! 
‘  
hM1 ;:::;M ′i ;:::;Mni−! 
  ‘ M 0i :Di[Mj=yj]i−1j=1; (2)
where the clause @i :zi1 :Bi1 : : : zip :Bim : (Ci1! (Ci2! (: : : (Ciq!Di) : : :)))2[
 ;@iP1 : : : Pp Q1 : : : Qq! M 0i , for some 16i6n and p; q possibly 0;
Introduction
‘  ; x :A hM1 ;:::;Mn; x;Mi−!  ; x :A; y :B
‘   hM1 ;:::;Mn;  x : A : Mi−!  ; y :x :A : B
(3)
and also a rule for -equalities.
Whilst the denition of resolution is appealing both proof- (see above) and model-
theoretically (see below), from the point of view of implementation, we must employ
a calculus which is dened using as little non-determinism as possible. Such a theory
has been provided in [151, 143]. It is based on a calculus L with (semi-decidable)
sequential judgements of the form  ) A, which is interpreted as a request to calculate
a term M such that   ‘ M :A in the -calculus. This calculus L is then rened in
two ways: (i) indeterminates are introduced to cope with the choice of terms in one
specic rule leading to a calculus U, with sequents of the  ) A() where  is an
indeterminate. Sequents in U are interpreted as requests to calculate terms M and N
such that   ‘ M :A[N=] is provable, with N corresponding to the notion of answer
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substitution; (ii) U’s search space is quotiented by observing that some permutations
in its derivations leave unchanged their -term extract and thus, when searching for
typable terms, it suces to nd a representative of each of the classes so generated.
Resolution calculi have been proposed for this calculus [140, 141] but dealing only
with types in clausal forms. However, such clausal forms are sucient to allow each
object-level natural deduction inference rule to be represented by a single meta-level
resolution step [151]. For example, the _-elimination rule of propositional intuitionistic
logic, represented as
_E :  : o: : o: : o:
true(_  )! (true()! true())! (true( )! true())! true();
gives rise to the meta-level resolution step
  ‘IL true(_  )  ; x : true()‘IL true()  ; y : true( )‘IL true()
  ‘IL true()
:
Another method based on resolution and unication and developed for the -cube
type systems could be applied to this calculus [40]. More recently, a proposal for a
new sequent calculus for , not requiring a clausal form for types, gives a one-one
correspondence between typable terms of the calculus and the normal terms of the
-calculus. It allows no permutations in the order in which inference rules occur on
derivations of typable terms and is therefore appropriate for proof-search that can be
performed in a bottom-up approach [137].
In the sequel, we develop here the dierent aspects and problems about this proof-
search and the possible impact of proof-objects on this search process and on the
connected computation analysis.
From the point of view of semantics, the key step is to identify a semantic counterpart
to the resolution rule (2). The basic idea goes as follows:
 Dene a class of Herbrand models by dening Herbrand prestructures and structures
together with a suitable standard Herbrand interpretation. The prestructure for Her-
brand models is identical to that required for model existence in requirement (i) of
Section 5, the salient feature being the construction of the category of worlds as the
full subcategory of the base category of contexts in which each arrow is of the form
  −! ;  0. Herbrand structures, however, are a more delicate matter. An Herbrand
structure H at world  and base   is a subset of the homset C( ; ) of realizations
between   and . 4 It follows that such Herbrand structures form a complete lattice,
with the least structure ? being that which assigns the empty set of arrows at each
world and base.
 Dene an operator T between Herbrand structures that can be considered to be a
semantic counterpart to the resolution rule (2). Given an Herbrand structureH; T(H)
is the Herbrand structure built as follows: at each world  and each base  , add to
4 This situation can be considered to be a variation on the ‘programs-as-worlds’ view of the semantics of
logic programs [107, 151].
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H()( ) all of those arrows that can be constructed by one resolution step from
arrows that are already forced by H according to the predicate j=)H .
3.5. Implementations
Implementations of (the languages of) logical frameworks fall into two main types:
interactive theorem provers and logic programming languages. Interactive theorem
provers, such as LCF [65, 128], Isabelle [129, 130], LEGO [98], NuPRL [47], TPS
[8], PVS [119, 118], ALF [100, 36], and Coq [127] have varying degrees of automated
search built into them. The two main logic programming languages based on the lan-
guage of (type-theoretic) logical frameworks are Miller and Nadathur’s Prolog [113]
and Pfenning’s Elf [132]. The language of Prolog is higher-order hereditary Harrop
formulae and has been used as a basis for a logical framework using a representation
mechanism amounting to judgements-as-types. The language of Elf is the -calculus
[72, 151, 140, 132], although the model of logic programming diers from that presented
by Pym and Wallen [143, 152]. 5 Meta-theoretic properties of deductive systems can
be directly formulated relationally in Elf [132]. However, ensuring the validity of an
Elf signature does not automatically guarantee the validity of the meta-theorems it
contains. One needs to prove that these relations actually represent total functions in
certain arguments and thus study of proof-search in the meta-theory is necessary. A
recent proposal for that is the design of a schema-checker that allows one to show
inductively input and output coverages and termination of the relations [157].
A theory of proof-search for a logical framework would need to build on a theory
of proof-search in the language of the framework to take account of the representation
of logics. Very little work has been done in this direction, however, so we sketch a
possible approach. Our point of departure is the calculus R considered together with our
sketch of the judgements-as-types representation mechanism. We propose a resolution
calculus, OR, tailored to the form of represented object-logics. For a given object-logic
L, represented by signature L, OR is a calculus of judgements of the form
 X ‘L   −!A;
corresponding to the sequent (X )‘L , with proof-object , in L. Reduction steps
in OR can then be seen to correspond to reduction steps in L. Such a calculus can
be interpreted in structures.
4. Proof-search and programming
A proof-object is not only a representation of a proof-search process. It is also a
realizer for a specication encoded by the sequent. For example, in intuitionistic logic,
the -terms can be considered as programs satisfying the logical specication expressed
5 Pym’s work higher-order unication for dependent types () builds directly on Huet’s seminal work
in [81, 80]. See also [45].
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with formulae. In case of classical linear logic, e.g., in the context of planning, proof
nets can be seen as correct plans from an initial state to a nal one [105]. From
this point of view, can we correlate the \quality" of the proof-search (or provability
search), i.e., eciency, readability, simplicity and the \quality" of the resulting proof-
objects, i.e., eciency of the programs or plans, readability? The correctness of the
proof-objects is a strong argument to use a proof-theoretic language as a programming
language or logic but it is not clear if a \good" proof is a \good" program or if a
\good" program can be also obtained by a proof-search [125].
Beside the general analysis of the relationships between logics, formal systems and
annotations, a given application can force us to x some choices by answering to
the following questions: What are the appropriate formal systems and annotation
languages? Are there existing proof-search methods we can use? Are new proof-
search methods or procedures needed? What is the eective use of proof-search and
of proof-objects in the context of programming; for instance with respect to proofs-
as-programs; proofs-as-states; proofs-as-processes; proofs-as-computations or proof-
search as computation paradigms?
It is also important to x what are the non-determinisms we aim to keep at the spec-
ication and proof-search levels, as well as inside proof-objects. Moreover, one cannot
ignore the inuence of complexity results throughout this study and the complexity
of search problems in type-theoretic languages has to be analysed and compared with
respect to non-type-theoretic systems.
Execution mechanisms for both logic and functional programming can be seen as
searches for cut-free proofs. In logic programming, an attempt to achieve a goal, or
query, G with respect to a program P can be seen as a search for a (special kind
of) proof in intuitionistic logic of the sequent P‘G. Typically, we are interested in
goals of the form 9x:G and aim to extract from the calculated proof a term, or answer
substitution, t, such that P‘G[t=x] is provable. Alternatively, via correspondences be-
tween types and propositions, evaluation in functional programming corresponds to the
normalization of proofs in a natural deduction system.
4.1. Proof-search and logic programming
Whilst both theorem proving and logic programming can be understood in terms
of proof-search, for logic programming we must impose more stringent requirements.
Basically, we must insist upon having an operational semantics that is not too non-
deterministic. A leading example of such an operational semantics is often summarized
as \goal-directedness", in which the goal formula can be read as a search instruction
according to the connectives of which it is comprised. For example, a goal G1 ^G2 is
read as an instruction to calculate proofs of both G1 and G2. Similarly, a goal G1 _G2
is read as an instruction to calculate a proof of at least one of G1 and G2. A goal of
the form G1G2, however, reveals a more subtle structure. It is read as an instruction
to calculate a proof of the goal G2 under the additional assumption, i.e., additional
program clause, G1. It follows that the formula G1 must be an instance of the class of
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formulae permitted to occur in programs. The structure program clauses must support
another aspect of goal-direct operational semantics, that clauses be invoked only if all
possible goal-directed search instructions have been applied, i.e., the problem has been
reduced to its simplest possible form. Such an operational semantics has an acceptably
low level of non-determinism, choices being restricted to the selection of a program
clause.
In Prolog-like languages, goal-directedness is characterized by uniform proofs, re-
stricted to hereditary Harrop formulae, for which they are complete for logical con-
sequence. A uniform proof is a cut-free proof in which every occurrence of a sequent
whose right-hand side is non-atomic is the conclusion of a right rule. In this setting,
a sequent ;‘G can be used to represent the state of an idealized logic program-
ming interpreter where  is the signature, or current set of non-logical constants,  is
the current program and G is the current goal. These ideas have been discussed, for
intuitionistic, classical and linear logics, in [67, 69, 107, 109, 113, 142, 152]. Languages
which adopt this point of view include Prolog [113], Lolli [74], Lygon [69, 142, 171],
Forum [108] and Elf [132, 133].
This study of searching for normal proofs, together with the connected studies about
permutability and reduction of non-determinism, often leads to new equivalent sequent
calculi that integrate the operational semantics at levels of both sequents and proofs.
For instance, the actual presentations of systems like Lolli [74], Lygon [142, 171, 69]
or Forum [108] are based on variants sequent calculi from which only uniform proofs
can be directly built and for which sequents are rened in dierent parts. Then the
operational meanings are involved at the logical level.
4.1.1. Specication logics
We consider at rst two views of logic programming based on LF [70, 11, 151]. Elf
is a logic programming language based on types through the propositions-as-types that
is suited for logic denition and metaprogramming [133]. Achieving a goal (type) G
with respect to a program (context)   corresponds to the search of a closed object M
of type G, where the language is determined by a signature  such that   ‘ M :G is
provable in LF. The answer to a query is not only a substitution for its free variables
but a term of query type. The LF language admits another natural interpretation as a
logic programming language, based on the calculus U (see Section 2.5) with sequents
of the  ) A(), where  is an indeterminate [143]. Such sequents are interpreted as
requests to calculate terms M and N such that   ‘ M :A[N=] is provable, with N
corresponding to the notion of answer substitution.
Sequent calculi can be used only to express deductions between formulae of the logic
but if we take into account a given interpretation (for instance formulae-as-processes
[89]) they can be used to represent specications [33], properties [106] or computa-
tions (for instance, reduction of processes, i.e., P ‘P0 interpreted as P P0). Consider
Prolog and its linear logic renement, Lolli. They provide for various forms of ab-
straction (abstract data types, modules, higher-order programming) but lack primitives
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for concurrency. A logic programming language like LO [5] provides for concurrency
but lacks abstraction mechanisms. To include concurrency, one typically deals with
linear logic programming and therefore to extend this notion of goal-directed search to
multiple-conclusion sequent.
Linear logic provides a view of formulae (occurring in contexts) as resources which
can be exploited to model the notion of state. Various works emphasise the possibility
to representing resource-based logics or imperative constructs but we aim to reason ef-
fectively about such representations. The linear logical framework (LLF) [31] combines
the expressive power of dependent types with linear logic to permit representations of
state-based deductive systems. Ecient proof-search in the style of logic programming
and based on uniform proof notion can be achieved in LLF.
A better view of formulae as resources, and associated notions of state, is provided
by BI, the logic of bunched implications [115, 116, 147, 149, 150, 153]. Corresponding
to BI is the logical framework RLF [148, 86], based on the -calculus, a language
with a full linear dependent function space. RLF has been used to represent weak
logics and -calculi and the type system of ML with references [86]. RLF can also be
interpreted as a logic programming language in the sense we have discussed.
As a specication logic, Forum modularly extends previous languages and allows
specications to include both concurrency and abstraction [108]. This meta-logic deals
with sequents of the form  :	;‘  and  :	;‘B , where  is a signature, 	 a set
of -formulae,  a multiset of -formulae,   a list of -formulae and B a -formula
and is based on uniform provability. Most logical systems, like Prolog, Isabelle and
LF, that are used for meta-level specications of proof systems have been developed on
intuitionistic principles. But, in such systems, specications of sequent calculus proofs
often need addition of various non-logical constants. In Forum, such specications are
natural and one can also handle substructural object-logics [108]. In this setting, there
is a compromise, xed by the completeness result, between provability (with uniform
proofs) and expressiveness of the logical fragment.
We can also consider concurrency in fragments of linear logic with an interpretation
in which formulae are processes or messages and connectives are algebraic operations
on processes; an example is provided by the ACL system [88]. In this context, the
non-determinism of proof-search corresponds to the non-determinism of execution. Be-
cause of some operational interpretations, it could be natural to have renements of
the sequent syntax. Such renements are motivated, in the context of specication or
programming, to have simple and readable expressions and to take into account the
operational interpretation that is also encoded in the corresponding sequent calculus.
For instance, the choice between single-conclusion sequents and multiple-conclusion
sequents, for a given logic, has consequences for both specication and proof-search.
This point is illustrated by previous works based on FILL for which we can dene
canonical (but not uniform) proof forms that are complete w.r.t. provability [21].
Inside such studies, a problem arises: whether or not to give a logical formalization
of some programming features or mechanisms? For example, useful specication logics
for concurrent and object-oriented programming can be proposed from renements
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of linear logic but such specication problems lead to new proof-theoretic problems,
including problems for proof-search [39, 90]. Let us mention among works attempting to
reduce theories or concepts to logic, the ones that aim to reduce arithmetic in logic for
which strategies for higher-order proof-search can be traced to strategies for arithmetic.
In the paper by Arai and Mints, in this volume, is a proposal for a proof-search strategy
in a cut-free logic which allows an exact modelling of cut-free arithmetic. This work
could form a basis for interfaces to existing well-developed proof-search engines.
4.1.2. Strategies and implementations
The design of new logic programming languages and theorem provers, such as for
fragments of linear logic, exposes new implementation problems and challenges, not
present in traditional languages. The problem of eciently managing the linear context,
in systems such as Lolli [74] and Lygon [171, 69], is very important: a way to solve it
consists in designing resource-management systems to eliminate the non-determinism in
the distribution of linear formulae (see the paper by Cervesato; Hodas and Pfenning, in
this volume). Thus, the eciency of implemented systems, expected to be used for non-
trivial applications, is improved through improved proof-search processes. Such strategy
has been recently adapted for multi-conclusion sequent calculi, for instance in the
Forum system [75] and in Lygon [69, 171]. Let us recall that linear logic programming
languages are divided into those implemented sequentially and those which are intended
as concurrent languages [89, 90] where non-determinisms in proof-search corresponds
to non-determinisms in the computation. A similar study presents a characterization of
a range of strategies for distributing and selecting resources in linear sequent calculus
proof-search [68]. It is based on a sequent calculus annotated with boolean constraints
and strategies are characterized by calculations of solutions of sets of boolean equations
generated by searches. Such a characterization encompasses local, global or intermediate
strategies. An appropriate implementation of resource-proofs would be to use a nite
domain constraint logic programming in order to provide an appropriate mix of proof-
search techniques and boolean constraints solving methods. Concerning complexity,
it seems possible to exploit the essential restrictions of linear logic programming to
hereditary Harrop formulae and concepts like paths [142, 68] to partition the sets of
boolean equations obtained into smaller solvable collections.
4.1.3. Extensions
There are proposals to extend simply typed hereditary Harrop formulae with deni-
tions. In fact, the use of denitions permits the construction of clearer programs and of
shorter proofs by using a denition rule similar to the Gentzen’s cut rule. Such a def-
inition mechanism can be used to nd proofs that are exponentially shorter than their
variants formed by means of neither the denition mechanism nor the cut rule [134].
In the extension proposed in [135], denitions can be used as abbreviations but can
also be employed in searching for shorter proofs of a goal and therefore a goal-directed
search procedure is dened and shown to be complete for the extended type system.
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In this setting, we are also interested to solve the problem of redundancy in the search
space by having a search procedure that produces exactly one proof (member of each
equivalence class). It is clear that open problems to address in the future consists of
unication in the presence of denitions and recursion at the level of simple types.
To reason, with the proof-search paradigm, a possible approach consists in introducing
new inference rules both for dealing with induction and for treating logical speci-
cations as denitions. The paper by McDowell and Miller, in this volume, proposes
such an extension of intuitionistic logic and proves the cut-elimination theorem, which
is important both for automation of proof-search and consistency of the logic.
4.2. Proof-search and functional programming
The proofs-as-programs paradigm in programming mainly consists in extracting pro-
grams from proofs in intuitionistic logic. This point of view has been studied in more
generality by Martin-Lof who has developed a system so-called Martin-Lof Type The-
ory [104] that is at the same time a programming language and the analogue for con-
structive mathematics of what the ZF system of set theory is for classical mathematics
[114].
4.2.1. Program synthesis
Such a system proposes a view of programming wherein the notion of type is iden-
tied with the (intuitionistic) notion of set and the notion of specication, which may
be seen as a task or problem to be solved, with the (intuitionistic) notion of propo-
sition. The solution of such a problem is an algorithm that may be viewed again as
an element of the set or an object of the corresponding type. In this spirit, we can
consider the notions of type and proposition to be identical and then present a single
calculus for the calculus of natural deduction and for the functional calculus. Therefore
we directly manipulate judgements of the form  : with appropriate type-theoretic
deduction systems. To show that a certain type  is inhabited by constructing a term
 of that type corresponds to show that a certain logical proposition  is valid by
constructing a object-proof  that proves it and also to show that a certain logical
specication  is satised by constructing a (functional) program  that satises it. In
this context, we write   ‘tt : to denote that  is a proof-object of proposition-type
 in the type theory tt.
Simple type theories have been extended to second- and higher-order logic [14] and
so permit universal type quantication, i.e., (8x :Type). Moreover, we can add de-
pendent types without losing desirable properties of the system, such as normalization.
Second-order systems like the Calculus of Constructions (CC) [35, 127] or AF2 [122],
issued from studies of the system F [64], can be used for program synthesis, i.e., to
extract programs from proofs of logical specications.
Recursive data types, as well as logical connectives, can be dened in the CC type
system by impredicative encoding. But it is impossible to derive an inductive schema
from such a denition. To overcome this problem, extensions of the type theory by
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inductive denitions have been proposed. In case of LF, in which types may only de-
pend on individuals, we can do proof-search in rst-order implicational predicate cal-
culus. If we add inductive denitions to LF we can do proof-search in full rst-order
predicate calculus with recursive data types. But to make the search space of proofs
smaller we have to add more reduction rules. Then, after proving properties (Church{
Rosser and strong normalization) of the resulting system and then classifying normal
forms, proof-search and unication procedures needs new appropriate operations. In
case of the AF2 system, an alternative second-order type system for programming with
proofs [101], inductive schemas are included in the logic and allows to use so-called
recursive or iterative data types dened in AF2. Automated proof-search, based on spe-
cic normal proofs (so-called recursive) that are complete with respect to provability,
has been proposed for this framework [125]. But the extracted program is not always
in this case the more ecient we can obtain. In the setting of constructive program
synthesis, it can be better to have more exible and interactive proof methods to be
able to synthesis the better programs and not the better proofs.
Because of the relationships between propositions and types and between proofs and
programs it is clear that automated proof-search in type theory can be used not only
to nd a proof-object  but also to use it for a computational purpose [50]. Viewing
proof-objects as programs can inuence the study of proof-search to take into account
both the computational content and the complexity of the resulting proofs.
4.2.2. Automated proof-search
In the context of constructive program synthesis, as the interactive nature of proof
process stands in contrast to an ecient program development, eorts have also to be
made to support automated proof-search in some fragments of the type theory. There
exist intuitionistic type theories that can be encoded in rst-order intuitionistic logic
and mainly fragments where such an encoding is direct [161]. Consequently, problems
of proof-search in type theory are directly translated into problems in proof-search
in intuitionistic logic. Moreover one optimises such a translation for enhancing the
eciency of automated proof-search for the initial problem. Such encoding has been
developed from MLTT [161] but also from LF to the logic hhw of hereditary Harrop
formulae with quantication at all non-predicate types [48]. We can also consider an
alternative and dual use of such encodings. As nding proofs corresponds to nding
inhabitants of types one can in the case of implicational logics, specify the set of all
the -terms representing proofs in these logics. Therefore, new proof-search algorithms
have been designed from the search of inhabitants (see Bunder’s paper in this volume).
Without such encodings, it is also possible to adapt or integrate more classical proof-
search into a program synthesis environment. For example, in [19], a new tableaux-
based calculus for rst-order intuitionistic logic is proposed from the classical tableau
calculus extended with -terms. One benet is that one can use proof-search meth-
ods known in classical logic, avoiding the order dependence of rule applications. In
a similar setting, a particular proof-search procedure designed for higher-order logic,
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has been recently used to improve proof-search in the Calculus of Constructions (see
Felty’s paper in this volume). The initial search procedure in CC [40] has been re-
formulated, with the introduction of a new notion called \search context". Such a
generic notion could be adapted for another type systems like  or hohH (higher-
order hereditary formulae) and lead to new proof-search methods. It is clear that with
use of classical theorem proving methods into a program synthesis environment, the
problem of methods integration arises the related issues of proof representations, proof
transformations and of complexity. For example, a system like Nuprl [47] integrates a
variety of interactively controlled and automated techniques for theorem proving and
algorithm design. This has led to studies of the integration of an automated theorem
prover for intuitionistic logic into such an environment, mainly for the purely logical
parts of a type-theoretic proof. For such parts, one can use an ecient intuitionistic
matrix prover but the resulting proof, based on a multiple-conclusion sequent calculus,
has to be transformed into a standard intuitionistic proof which can be integrated as a
proof plan for solving the initial formula [43]. Another approach consists in embed-
ding classical proof-objects, like rst-order tableaux, into a type system (adapted or
extended for this purpose) by conversion into -terms representing proofs in such a
system.
4.2.3. Extraction and verication
Parts of a constructive proof may be irrelevant to the actual computation which
results; for example, a proof by induction may require a particular measure to demon-
strate that the induction is well-founded. Although it is possible to reason classically in
a constructive system, such reasoning is not generally well-supported. Then one may
wish to use a proof-assistant for classical logic as an aid to develop a program via a
proof in a constructive type theory. Some steps have been taken towards such a con-
nection providing automatic assistance for program verication, for instance with Nuprl
[79] and Coq [120]. Such work is motivated by the possibility of applying classical
tools in constructive proofs developments but also from the classical side of consider-
ing classical proofs as programs [126] and identifying executable subsets of classical
theory to execute specications as prototypes. The paper by Caldwell, Gent and Un-
derwood, in this volume, presents a ne analysis of the problem \from extraction to
verication and back", using the classical language of PVS [118] and the type theory
of Nuprl.
4.2.4. Proof transformations
Recall that a proof transformation procedure is mainly based on hierarchical system
of permutation steps. Several works have proposed proof transformations (and their
implementation) applicable to the optimization of extracted programs for instance in
systems such as LF [3] or Nuprl [99]. An alternative approach of program transfor-
mation in type theories consists in formalizing methods and techniques of program
transformations directly in the considered type theory | with a clear impact on the
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proof-search process. It leads to the study of the proof theory of certain elementary
program derivations and to provide a semantics for the transformations as derivations
in a type theory. In the setting of [43] another type of proof transformations, from
a formal system to another one, has to be studied but with accurate investigation of
the complexity of the resulting proofs. Moreover, the transformations must preserve
the intended sub-specication of the program to be synthesised. One could have an
exponential increase of proof length by such transformation but the program term can
benet from such an approach.
4.3. Induction
The automation of inductive proof has been appreciated to be a dicult problem
for a long time [23]. We conclude this section by briey remarking upon the work
of Bundy et al. on a collection of systems designed to nd proofs involving induction
rules, in the context of program synthesis and extraction.
Bundy et al.’s key idea is that of a proof plan to guide (inductive) proof [24, 25].
Proof plans work by analyzing the syntactic structure of the inductive search problem
to identify appropriate induction hypotheses, the key technique being rippling. Recent
work has been to extend this approach to higher-order proofs, via an interface to HOL
[66], and to consider the dynamic generation of plans. The idea of a critic [83, 84]
has been introduced to make productive use of failure. Applications include problems
in hardware verication [27]. Let us mention that similar works have been developed
in the setting of the AF2 framework with the denition of specic induction strategies
and proof plans for given specications [51] and illustrate some diculties to design
appropriate inductive proof-search methods in such type theories dedicated to program
synthesis.
A number of systems have been implemented, allowing for a good deal of experi-
mental work, including the automation, using rippling, of inductive proofs. Clam is a
proof planning system for Oyster [26], a tactic-based implementation of the construc-
tive type theory of Martin-Lof. Clam uses pre- and post-conditions of Oyster tactics as
a basis for searching for plans. Once a plan for a given goal has been found, it can be
expected that the resulting tactic will solve the goal. Experimental experience shows
that the search space for plans is often small enough to allow the automatic calculation
of plans to be tractable. A more recent implementation is the XBarnacle system [97].
5. Looking forward: semantics and proof-search
It is clear that the semantics of a logic can, in many cases, have a strong inuence
on the design of proof-search procedures; indeed, the semantics of the logic is often
used, more or less explicitly, to specify procedures. It follows that one possible way
to analyse or propose new proof-search procedures could consist in analysing the se-
mantics of the logic and considering its connection to the proof-search process. Model
elimination and resolution [49] can both be understood in this way.
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5.1. Which semantics?
Relevant, or substructural, logics are often syntactically or proof-theoretically moti-
vated and their syntax often seems to be better understood than their semantics. They
have typically algebraic and sometimes categorical models that are not far removed
from the syntax. One also considers Kripke-style models that are something where
formulae are mapped by valuations to set of worlds and relations and operations on
worlds are used to formulate semantic clauses for the connectives. In fact, it denes an
algebraic model in the powerset of the set of the worlds. For example, Kripke models
for intuitionistic logic appear natural because everything is reduced to an ordering of
the set of worlds and the semantic clauses for connectives are quite natural. Other
kinds of semantics have been introduced and studied in recent years: phase structures
[61], quantales [172], coherence semantics [61] and one has a deeper understanding of
their strong relationships [117]. Therefore it is possible to grasp the essential meaning
of completeness theorems with respect to these semantics. Moreover, the notion of
resource can be studied from the semantic point of view, for example, by requiring
a resource to be a preordered commutative monoid as in the Kripke resource seman-
tics [116, 147, 115, 149, 150, 153]. It is not clear if Kripke-style semantics is what is
needed for some relevant, or substructural, logics and their applications. Dierent sorts
of semantics, inspired by proof theory or category theory [93], may be better adapted.
5.2. Semantics and proofs
We illustrate some points about semantics and proof-search by considering some
studies of fragments of linear logic. For instance, Avron [10] proposes several simple al-
gebraic models of multiplicative and multiplicative-additive fragments and demonstrates
the interest of such models by proving some unexcepted proof-theoretical properties of
these logical fragments. Related studies in BI, the logic of bunched implications, can
be found in [116, 147, 149, 150, 153].
The study of completeness results is important. For instance, it is well-known that
Petri nets provide a sound and complete model for the -free fragment of intuitionistic
linear logic (ILL) [46]. But with such a model, one cannot show, for example, that the
following sequent, (  )&  ‘ ( )& (  ) is not provable in ILL. For that we
need a new interpretation that is complete and it leads to revisit the semantics of the
logic and the basics about completeness (closure, completion). From the relationships
between the notions of ordered monoid and of quantale and a new closure operator,
one denes a new interpretation of ILL on Petri nets that allows to naturally give a
counter-example for the above formula [52]. Then, such revised semantics leads to
disprove some properties. Further work could be to derive new Kripke-style or alge-
braic semantics as foundations for new proof-and-refutation systems with, if possible,
methods for the eective construction of counter-models.
The usual completeness theorems are stated with respect to provability. But there is
a challenge of obtaining a full completeness theorem, of the kind found in categorical
logic, that is with respect to proofs. Such a requirement is particularly strong in the
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presence of indeterminates, a pervasive tool in proof-search. With such a completeness,
one has a strong connection between syntax and semantics. A rst attempt has been
made with a games semantics for linear logic [1] in which formulae denote games
and proofs denote winning strategies. The completeness result for it says that every
strategy in the model is the denotation of some proof. This semantics could naturally
have a strong impact on automated construction of proofs or proof nets. It seems to
capture more naturally the dynamical intuitions behind linear logic and it potentially
provides a unifying framework for the semantics of computation in which concurrent
processes, typed functional languages and complexity are handled in a integrated way.
5.3. Semantics and complexity
To summarize these dierent aspects of the study of semantics for proof-search pur-
poses, it seems that the progress made so far encourages us to apply semantics methods
in the design and understanding of proof-search procedures. For example, it could be
done with annotations (or labels, or proof-objects) that allow better characterizations
of the dependencies and relationships between formulae that lead to (non-)provability.
In fact, such works on semantics have complementary goals. One is to develop struc-
tures and algorithms for proof-search dedicated to various logics having in fact the
same semantical foundations (see [37]). Another is, in a given logic, to improve the
proof-search and to analyse its complexity. For example, in linear logic, connections
between proof-search and probabilistic games, used in complexity theory, have been
investigated [95] and it follows that linear logic proof-search can be seen as a game.
Such game is played on formulae and its moves are instances of inference rules and
the results issued from this approach are for instance lower bounds for local proof-
search [96]. The investigations about semantics can be the source of the design of new
equivalent (sequent) calculi and induced proof-search methods with good complexity
results (for instance polynomial proof-search systems).
5.4. Semantics for search-based computation
We have previously explained, in Section 4.1, how the requirements of operational
semantics can be used to design logic programming languages and their execution
procedures. We remark that the operational semantics can be viewed both in terms of
proof systems | via uniform proofs or resolution, etc. | or in terms of models |
via a xed point construction of a term model. We also remark that neither of these
points of view provides an adequate account of the execution dynamics of logic pro-
gramming. For example, least xed point models of the kind described in, for example,
[77, 107, 151] provide no account of details such as clause selection, backtracking or,
indeed, Prolog’s imperative constructs such as \assert", \retract" and \!".
5.4.1. Towards a new approach
We suggest that one potentially valuable approach towards solving these problems
lies in the provision of more sophisticated denotational semantics for search-based
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computation. Such as semantics must capture the use of a proof system not as a calculus
for deduction but rather as a calculus for construction (or reduction) as discussed in
Section 3.1 and this, as we sketch below, does indeed seem possible. However, we must
also ask that such a semantics be capable of interpreting the dynamic aspects of the
construction of proofs so as, for example, to be able to distinguish between breadth- and
depth-rst strategies. A rst example is, perhaps, provided by Schmidt’s denotational
treatment of backtracking using Success continuations and Failure continuations [158].
Given such a semantic account, we may, for example, aim to focus on dierent specic
models for dierent purposes. For example, we may wish to work with non-provability
via the generation of counter-models.
5.4.2. Semantic foundations for search spaces
We have seen, in Section 2.3, that a derivation of a sequent   ‘ is interpreted by a
map f : [[ ]]M! [[]]M in a model M. Such a map is, typically, dened by induction
on structure of the (semantics of) the sequent. In this setting, a (two-premiss, say) rule
of inference R is interpreted as a map F :MM!M, so that if f interprets a proof
 of   ‘, f0 interprets a proof 0 of  0 ‘0 and g interprets a proof 	(;0) of
( ;  0)‘  (; 0), where
  ‘  0 ‘′0
( ;  0)‘	(;′) (; 0) R;
then F : (f;f0) 7! g.
Recall that in search-based computation, we do not have a given derivation. Rather,
we start, prototypically, with a sequent
(  ‘)(X )
in which there is a \logical variable", or indeterminate, X . We aim to calculate a term
t such that there is a derivation  of the sequent   ‘ [t=X ]. However, it may be that
there is no such term and no such proof, even in the propositional case, without logical
variables. It follows that the objects of semantic interest are sequents   ‘  in which
all of  ,  and  may depend upon logical variables. Prototypically, an endsequent
is annotated with a proof-object consisting exactly of an logical variable,   ‘X , so
that a reduction operator O, i.e., a rule, such as R,
  ‘Y   0 ‘Y ′ 0
  ‘X  O;
read backwards, from conclusion to premisses, is interpreted in a model M not as a
map from M to MM but rather as a map
F :M()!M()M(0)
where ,  and 0 are indeterminates freely adjoined to M and used to interpret
X , Y and Y 0, respectively. Thus the semantics of a calculus viewed as a system of
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reduction operators can be seen as being given by a polynomial construction [93] over
the semantics of the calculus view as a system of inference rules.
6. Summary
We have presented our view of the scope and state of study of proof-search in
type-theoretic languages. We have tried to place the study in its broader logical and
computational context, paying particular attention to topics which seem to us to be
somewhat underdeveloped. The key points can be conveniently summarized as follows:
 We considered what it is, in logical terms, to be a \type-theoretic language".
 We considered the logical status of proof-search and reviewed some of the key
techniques that have been developed.
 We have considered what is the proof-search problem in type-theoretic languages
and have, using a leading example drawn from logical frameworks, illustrated some
of the objectives and techniques.
 Turning, more specically, to programming we have discussed the ro^le of proof-
search theory in both the logic and functional programming paradigms. We have
paid attention to a number of specic issues, including:
 strategies and implementations of logic programming;
 extensions of logic programming;
 (functional) program synthesis (including automation);
 extraction and verication;
 transformations; and
 induction.
 Finally, we have proposed the value of semantic methods in the study of proof-
search, drawing upon our examples and suggesting some directions for research.
Throughout this development, we have indicated how the papers in this volume con-
tribute to the development of the ideas and techniques discussed. Indeed, our overview
has been partly driven by the scope of the contributed papers.
Finally, we remark that our view is necessarily incomplete and biased towards our
own interests. We oer our apologies to anyone to whom we may have been inadver-
tently unjust.
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